Third Battle of Panipat
It is now 250 years since the Battle of Panipat when the Afghan's under Abdali defeated the Marathas. Both were so weakened by the battle that they were soon supplanted by the Sikhs and British respectively in the areas that they sought to sway.
Recent attempts have been made by Hindu activists to claim that the defeat was in fact a "strategic retreat".
Abdali entered the battle with several disadvantages.
1. His armaments were inferior, as the Marathas were equipped with the best of the era French cannons, while Abdali's army featured camel mounted light cannons.
2. Maratha power was on the ascendency and their sway over the areas in contention were actually better than Abdali's.
Abdali showed great military leadership in neutralizing both these disadvantages. He used his camel mounted artillary as a mobile firepower unit that overwhelmed and captured the Maratha cannons (it was after this that the battle turned).
More importantly, he called on the loyalty of fellow Muslim rulers to their religion to fight against the Maratha's whom he effectively labled as "Hindus".
A key ally acquired thus was Shuja-ud-Daula of Oudh. Shuja joined Abdali against the wishes of his mother in spite of the fact that the Maratha's had been traditional friends of his family and had supported him earlier (much against modern propaganda, Maratha's were no more "Hindus" than the Mughals were "Muslims", they both had cross religious alliances dictated by needs of the state). Shuja joined Abdali reluctantly and was mistreated by Abdali badly later. He lived to rue his decision to ally himself with Abdali.
The battle turned out badly for almost everyone who took part in it. Historical consensus is that there were 80000 dead on the Maratha side and about 35000 on Abdali's side. Abdali's casualties were a big factor in tempering his ambitions, it was not just the revolt of his troops.
In any effect claiming that it was a strategic retreat by the Maratha's is nonsense. Both the General and Crown Prince were killed in battle.
Two key lessons to take away from the battle are:
1. Do not over extend your self and become obsessed with one enemy when there are in fact several (both Abdali and Maratha's were guilty in this regard as they ignored respectively the ascendency of the Sikhs and the British).
2. Never get swayed by religious types who call on you to oppose someone purely based on religious affinity. Ignore the call, particularly if the person you are asked to go against has demonstrated friendship in the past.
Recent attempts have been made by Hindu activists to claim that the defeat was in fact a "strategic retreat".
Abdali entered the battle with several disadvantages.
1. His armaments were inferior, as the Marathas were equipped with the best of the era French cannons, while Abdali's army featured camel mounted light cannons.
2. Maratha power was on the ascendency and their sway over the areas in contention were actually better than Abdali's.
Abdali showed great military leadership in neutralizing both these disadvantages. He used his camel mounted artillary as a mobile firepower unit that overwhelmed and captured the Maratha cannons (it was after this that the battle turned).
More importantly, he called on the loyalty of fellow Muslim rulers to their religion to fight against the Maratha's whom he effectively labled as "Hindus".
A key ally acquired thus was Shuja-ud-Daula of Oudh. Shuja joined Abdali against the wishes of his mother in spite of the fact that the Maratha's had been traditional friends of his family and had supported him earlier (much against modern propaganda, Maratha's were no more "Hindus" than the Mughals were "Muslims", they both had cross religious alliances dictated by needs of the state). Shuja joined Abdali reluctantly and was mistreated by Abdali badly later. He lived to rue his decision to ally himself with Abdali.
The battle turned out badly for almost everyone who took part in it. Historical consensus is that there were 80000 dead on the Maratha side and about 35000 on Abdali's side. Abdali's casualties were a big factor in tempering his ambitions, it was not just the revolt of his troops.
In any effect claiming that it was a strategic retreat by the Maratha's is nonsense. Both the General and Crown Prince were killed in battle.
Two key lessons to take away from the battle are:
1. Do not over extend your self and become obsessed with one enemy when there are in fact several (both Abdali and Maratha's were guilty in this regard as they ignored respectively the ascendency of the Sikhs and the British).
2. Never get swayed by religious types who call on you to oppose someone purely based on religious affinity. Ignore the call, particularly if the person you are asked to go against has demonstrated friendship in the past.
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